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Who Got Their Way? Advocacy Coalitions and the Irish Climate Change Law 
 
Abstract: This study investigates (1) which organisations saw their positions on two 
contentious issues reflected in the Irish climate law of 2015 and (2) what role advocacy 
coalitions played in the policy process. These questions are answered drawing theoretically 
from the Advocacy Coalition Framework and by conducting a network analysis of survey data 
collected from the organisations involved in the national climate policy process. The study 
finds that several institutionally important or economically powerful organisations, particularly 
those involved in the agricultural sector, as well as the government parties saw their preferences 
reflected in the law. This resulted in legislation that excluded binding emission reductions 
targets, differentiating it from similar laws introduced in other European countries. 
Organisations in favour of stronger regulation formed a coalition to advocate for their positions, 
but they largely failed to get their way.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, several countries have introduced national climate legislation to establish the 
legal framework for driving a transition to a low carbon future. An analysis of the political 
contest over such laws can help us understand the dynamics of domestic climate politics and 
the reasons behind countries’ policy choices. Such understanding is important because, even 
though climate change obligations are agreed in international negotiations, it is within countries 
where policy pathways are decided. 
Researchers have previously explained national environmental policy choices by 
analysing the preferences of political actors (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012), the emphasis that 
political parties put on environmental protection (Schulze, 2014), the influence of veto players 
(Madden, 2014), the role of policy entrepreneurs (Carter and Childs, 2017), the 
experimentation with governance innovations (Matschoss and Repo, 2018), the degree of 
centralization in national executives (Leinaweaver and Thomson, 2016), the level of political 
consensus required (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008), and how policy actors can use the resources 
available to them (Compston, 2009). This paper draws on ideas from the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) and the field of policy network analysis to investigate how the structure and 
the internal dynamics of the Irish climate change policy network shaped Ireland’s national 
climate law - The Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 (CALCD Act).  
We identify two issues that were particularly contentious: the exclusion of greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction targets and the composition and independence of the Climate Change 
Advisory Council (CCA Council). Our objectives are to establish (1) which organisations saw 
their positions on these issues reflected in the law and (2) to determine the role advocacy 
coalitions played in the policy process. The case is particularly interesting because, unlike 
similar legalisation in other EU countries (the UK, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden), 
the Irish law does not include specific emissions reduction targets. Their omission is significant 
because Ireland is currently one of the worst performers in the EU (Green Budget Europe, 
2016). Indeed, the Irish Environmental Protection Agency projects that the country will not 
meet its EU 2020 targets (EPA, 2017).   
The Fine Gael-Labour Party coalition government that formed in 2011 agreed in 
principle to introduce climate legislation, but made no promises about its form or content. An 
environmental coalition pushed for a law that would include emissions reduction targets, but 
the government rejected the idea. Several organisations that were either institutionally 
important or economically powerful also opposed targets, with two of the most influential 
organisations involved in Ireland’s agricultural sector among those sharing the government’s 
position. In addition to binding targets, the environmental coalition lobbied for the 
establishment of an independent CCA Council. The government initially rejected their 
proposals, but in the final stage of the law’s development they granted the Council legal 
independence. However, the composition of the Council differs to what the environmental 
coalition had proposed. The law reserves four of the ten places on the Council for the directors 
or chief executives of The Environmental Protection Agency, the Economic and Social 
Research Institute, the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland and Teagasc (the Agriculture 
and Food Development Authority). Environmental coalition actors were not convinced that all 
these organisations were fully independent of both state and stakeholder interests.  
The results of this study do not meet the ACF expectation that coalitions play a central 
role in a policy process. In the Irish climate change policy domain, only one coalition advocated 
policy positions and they were unable to persuade those with decision-making power to adopt 
their proposals. Those who did get their way were powerful organisations that did not engage 
in coalition building. Rather, their positions were reflected in the law because they aligned with 
the government’s preferences. Consequently, we suggest the importance of comparative 
research that examines the conditions under which advocacy coalitions matter for policy 
outcomes and the conditions under which they do not. 
 
The Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act  
The debate over a national climate law began just prior to the 2007 general election 
when Friends of the Earth Ireland proposed that national climate legislation similar to the UK’s 
Climate Change Act be introduced. Their proposal failed to gain enough support to proceed 
through the legislative process when the Labour Party introduced it in the Seanad (The upper 
house of the Irish national legislature) later that year. Following the election, the Green Party 
entered government for the first time, albeit as a minority partner with Fianna Fáil and the 
Progressive Democrats. They had no plans in their manifesto to introduce climate legislation, 
but did pledge to reduce emissions by 3 per cent per year. The Green Party significantly 
strengthened their relative position in the coalition after the vote share won by the government 
parties at the local elections in 2009 fell dramatically and several independent Teachtaí Dála 
(TDs (Members of Parliament)) withdrew their support for the government. This change 
enabled the Greens to compel Fianna Fáil to commit to the introduction of climate legislation. 
In December 2009, the Green Party’s John Gormley, who at the time was Minister for the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, published a Framework for Climate Change 
Bill 2010 (Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2010a) and stated his 
intention to publish a climate bill in 2010. He pursued this objective despite opposition from 
the Departments of Agriculture, Finance, and the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), as well as 
some civil servants within the Department of the Environment (Torney, 2017). 
In late 2010, the Joint Committee on Climate Change and Energy Security published a 
report on climate change law (Joint Committee on Climate Change and Energy Security, 2010). 
The report shaped the content of the Climate Change Response Bill the government produced 
soon after (Oireachtas, 2010). The bill envisioned an emissions reduction trajectory of 2.5% 
per year and a cumulative reduction of 80% by 2050, mirroring the target of the UK’s Climate 
Change Act. The proposal included these targets despite intensive lobbying from the Irish 
Farmers’ Association (IFA) and other business interests (Minihan, 2015; Torney, 2017). The 
bill also included a provision to establish an advisory board similar to the Committee on 
Climate Change established by the UK’s Climate Chance Act. The advisory board would have 
the power to initiate a review of the government’s climate policy, including a review of the 
adequacy of the country’s emissions reduction targets.  
The Green Party tried and failed to introduce the bill amid the political chaos of the 
worst economic crisis in the country’s history - it was just weeks after the state received a €67.5 
billion bailout from the Troika and the government implemented the most draconian budget in 
the state’s history. The Green Party’s fixation on the bill made them appear out of touch with 
the immediate concerns of the public and went against the preferences of their coalition 
partners as well as several government departments. The Party subsequently lost all their seats 
in the February 2011 general election.    
The government that formed after the election, made up of the centre-right Fine Gael 
Party and the centre-left Labour Party, agreed in their Programme for Government to introduce 
a national climate law (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011). In 2012, a public consultation that 
was undertaken received over 600 submissions, with over 90% of respondents supporting the 
inclusion of emission targets and the establishment of an independent expert advisory body 
(Oireachtas, 2013). In early 2013, the Department of the Environment published the draft heads 
of a Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Bill (Department of the Environment, 
Community and Local Government, 2013). The draft did not include emissions reduction 
targets or provide for an independent advisory body. This was referred to the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on the Environment, Culture and the Gaeltacht, which held public hearings and 
sought submissions from stakeholders. The information they gathered led the committee to 
recommend that the law define ‘low carbon’ and that it establish an expert advisory body 
independent of both state and stakeholder interests (Oireachtas, 2013). They recommended that 
the roles of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI), the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI), and Teagasc be limited 
to the provision of technical support.  
The Department of the Environment published a revised bill in 2014 (Department of 
the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2014). The bill did not explicitly state 
that the Council would be independent and reserved places on the Council for the directors or 
chief executives of the EPA, the ESRI, the SEAI and Teagasc. The bill did not define low 
carbon or include emissions reductions targets, despite civil society organisations (Stop 
Climate Chaos, 2014) and some businesses arguing for their inclusion (Irish Corporate Leaders 
on Climate Change, 2014). The IFA (2015) and Ibec, Ireland’s largest employer organisation 
(Ibec, 2013), welcomed their exclusion. 
The Department of the Environment published an updated draft of the bill in January 
2015. Agricultural interests and business groups were broadly satisfied with the bill (Torney, 
2017). NGOs and their allies were disappointed and continued to lobby for the inclusion of 
targets and an independent advisory council. In the summer of 2015, the new Minister for the 
Environment, Alan Kelly of the Labour Party, responded to their campaign by granting legal 
independence to the CCA Council. He also inserted a reference to climate justice in response 
to NGOs’ lobbying, but rejected their calls to include targets. With these modifications, and 
the possibility that no legislation would be passed before the government’s term ended in early 
2016, NGOs scaled back their efforts (Torney, 2017). With the 2015 Paris climate conference 
on the horizon, the passing of climate change legislation offered the Labour Party an 
opportunity for a legislative victory during a time when they faced widespread protests in 
opposition to the government’s plans to introduce household water charges. The parliament 
debated the final draft of the Bill in late 2015, and then the President signed it into law later 
that year. 
The passing of an overarching national climate law in Ireland was a lengthy process 
that involved the 2013 bill going through several modifications before its enactment. The result 
was a law that differed in some significant respects to the UK’s Climate Change Act. The 
CALD Act establishes a CCA Council that is formally independent from government control, 
but will have members from specific state funded organisations. The most significant 
difference between the two however is the Irish law’s omission of targets. The Irish law also 
requires that plans and frameworks must be ‘at the least cost to the national economy and adopt 
measures that are cost-effective and do not impose an unreasonable burden on the Exchequer’. 
The omission of targets reflects the preferences of the two government parties, which were 
concerned about how targets might affect their plans to expand agricultural output. They judged 
that the economic costs of reducing Ireland’s relatively high level of agricultural emissions 
(46.8% of the non-EU Emissions Trading System total in 2015 (EPA, 2016) outweighed the 
benefits.   
 
Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is a belief-orientated approach to analysing the 
policymaking process that posits that the best way to understand how policy develops is to 
focus on policy subsystems and the beliefs of the organisations involved in a policy process 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). A subsystem is comprised of a set of public and private 
organisations which are actively engaged in the debate over a specific policy problem or issue 
in a geographically defined location. The ACF identifies beliefs as the overarching and most 
significant factor underpinning the coordinated behaviour of the actors participating in a policy 
process. The ACF assumes policy actors tend to form coalitions with those with whom they 
share beliefs rather than with those with whom they share institutional affiliation. These 
coalitions consist of actors ‘from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest 
group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system - i.e. a set of basic values, 
causal assumptions, and problem perceptions - and who show a non-trivial degree of 
coordinated activity over time’ (Sabatier 1988: 139). These advocacy coalitions then engage 
and compete in a policy processes with a view to seeing their policy goals achieved.  
Of relevance to the present study are: (1) the ACF’s argument that there is an 
association between the outcome of a policy debate and the policy beliefs of the coalitions that 
participated in the process, and (2) how the framework defines an advocacy coalition - the 
presence of coordinated activity and shared beliefs amongst a subset of organisations. Guided 
by these contentions, we investigate the extent to which the organisations involved in the Irish 
climate change policy process formed advocacy coalitions. Following this, we then examine 
the beliefs of both individual organisations and the coalitions, with the objective of determining 
who supported or opposed emission reduction targets and the CCA Council proposed in the 
2013 climate bill. This approach enables us to establish which organisations saw their 
preferences reflected in the law and to explain what role advocacy coalitions played in the 
policy process. 
 
Data and Methods 
We use a policy network analysis approach to identify advocacy coalitions (Henry, 2011; 
Ingold, 2011; Matti and Sandstrom, 2011; Gronow and Yla-Anttila, 2016). Policy networks 
are meso-level social structures consisting of a configuration of social relations between 
interdependent actors, which form around a particular policy problem or set of policy issues. 
Conceived in this way, researchers then observe, measure and analyse actors’ beliefs and 
relationships using network analysis methods. Researchers calculate network statistics to gain 
insights into the roles that different actors play, measure how power is distributed, examine 
how subsets of actors engage with one another and to determine how actors are organised or 
integrated into the network. This approach has been taken to analyse international  (Hirschi, 
2010), national (Ingold & Fischer 2014; Ingold 2011; Yun et al. 2014; Gronow and Ylä-Anttila, 
2016) and sub-national (Elgin & Weible 2013; Frank et al. 2012) climate politics.  
We collected data through a survey of organisations involved in the Irish climate 
change policymaking process. We identified the organisations surveyed using a two-stage 
process. We first analysed multiple documentary sources to identify a list of potential 
organisations to survey (Oireachtas, 2010; Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government, 2010b; Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 
2012; Wagner and Payne, 2017). We then consulted four individuals with expertise in different 
aspects of the national climate policy debate. Each expert identified the organisations on the 
preliminary list that they believed we should survey. We then compared the experts’ lists to 
determine which organisations at least three of the experts identified. This left us with 57 
organisations, of which 52 responded to our questionnaire in Autumn 2013. When we 
contacted organisations, we sought the person responsible for articulating their organisation’s 
climate policy positions (or environmental policy when no person had this responsibility). In 
organisations without someone specialising in climate or environmental policy, we contacted 
those as high up the hierarchy as possible. We instructed respondents to indicate their 
organisation’s positions, not their personal opinions. Approximately 30% of respondents 
completed the questionnaire in the presence of one of the researchers. The remaining 
respondents completed the questionnaire online or returned a paper copy by post.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
We collected data on the cooperative behaviour of the organisations in the network by asking 
respondents: With which of the listed organisations does your organisation cooperate 
regularly? We used this data to construct an adjacency matrix that corresponds to the network 
of directed cooperation ties between all the organisations surveyed. Following the approach of 
Ansell et al. (2009) and Gronow and Ylä-Anttila (2016), we used Ucinet’s Factions routine to 
identify the membership of densely connected clusters within the network. Using this routine, 
the researcher decides in advance the number of clusters into which the actors are separated. 
In practice, this requires an iterative process whereby several solutions (typically 2, 3, 4 or even 
more) are tested. A researcher determines the number of clusters present in a network based on 
their theoretical motivations and the Faction routine’s measure for the proportion of 
correctness, a statistical measure for the goodness of fit. 
Our questionnaire presented each respondent with a list of organisations that 
participated in domestic climate politics in recent years and asked respondents to indicate 
which of these they believed were especially influential in domestic climate change politics. 
We used these data to calculate a reputational influence score for each organisation that is 
measured on a scale of 0-1. An organisation scores 1 if they are cited as being influential by 
every other organisation in the network. They score 0 if no organisations cited them as being 
influential.  
We collected data on the policy beliefs of each organisation by asking respondents to 
indicate on a five-point Likert scale (No, totally reject = 1, Neutral = 3, Strongly agree = 5) 
their level of support for 21 different climate policies. To calculate the degree to which each 
actor held pro-mitigation beliefs we summed their responses and normalized their level of 
agreement on a scale of 0-1. A score of 1 indicates that an actor strongly agreed with all 21 
policy proposals, while a score of 0 indicates that they totally rejected all 21 proposals. This 
metric allows us to determine which organisations share a similar level of support for pro-
mitigation policies and to measure the distance between the beliefs of organisations.  
We collected data from each of the organisations about the 2013 draft heads of the 
climate bill by asking them if they supported the exclusion of long-term emissions targets and 
if they agreed with the CCA Council proposed by the bill. We asked each respondent to indicate 
on a scale of -100 to +100 their level of agreement or disagreement with the two proposals. A 
cluster’s average score for a proposal is 100 if all the organisations in the cluster indicated that 
they fully supported it, while a score of -100 indicates that they all totally disagreed with it. 
This metric measures the level of support expressed by each organisation and by each cluster 
for each proposal. It enables us to identify the clusters with the strongest positions on the two 
issues and to determine the level of consensus on the issues within each of the clusters.  
 
Analysis and Results 
Cooperation clusters 
We began by calculating the clustering coefficient to measure the extent to which actors in the 
network cluster together. At 0.47, the coefficient is almost three times the network density of 
0.17, providing evidence for the presence of clusters. We then applied Ucinet’s Factions 
algorithm to the network of cooperation ties among all 57 organisations as this allows us to 
include the five non-respondents for whom we only have data on their incoming ties. We 
identify three densely connected clusters of organisations and a heterogeneous set of 
unconnected outsiders.1 The proportion of correctness for the four-faction solution is 0.787. 
We reran the routine multiple times to ensure that the actors placed in each cluster was not 
random. Cluster density describes the proportion of potential connections in a cluster that are 
actual connections. The within group densities of the three clusters are 0.44 (Governance), 0.48 
(Business, Energy, and Research cluster), and 0.47 (Environmental cluster). The density of the 
whole network is 0.16, substantially lower than the density of the ties within each of the three 
clusters. The heterogeneous set of outsider organisations had a within group density of 0, 
indicating that these organisations did not cooperate with one another.  
When we test for the presence of five, six or seven clusters the proportion of correctness 
increases marginally, but the density of the ties in the additional clusters are less than that of 
the whole network. Therefore, increasing the number of clusters only serves to create additional 
sets of heterogeneous unconnected outsiders rather than to identify additional densely 
connected clusters. Moreover, these additional clusters contain the actors with the least number 
of cooperation ties with the actors in the three densely connected clusters when the four-faction 
solution is applied. When we test for the presence of three clusters the proportion of correctness 
falls. This occurs because it forces the algorithm to integrate the weakly connected actors into 
three clusters. The four factions’ solution is justifiable because it creates three clusters with a 
similar density and places the actors with few cooperation ties with the actors in three densely 
connected clusters into a separate outsider group.  
Table 2, below, lists the ten organisations with the highest reputational influence scores 
in each of the four clusters. Government departments dominate the first cluster, which contains 
 
1 As a robustness check, we applied a hierarchical clustering algorithm to the data (Ward’s method using 
Manhattan distances). This also generates three clusters. Each contains slightly fewer organisations, but the 
overwhelming majority of the most influential members in each of the clusters were the same. The SEAI are the 
only influential actor to be assigned to a different cluster, moving from the Business, Energy and Research cluster 
to the governance cluster. 
many of the organisations that were perceived to be the most influential in the network. The 
second cluster has a more heterogeneous membership. It primarily contains organisations with 
energy interests, but there are also several research institutions and non-energy related private 
sector actors. NGOs dominate the third cluster, but it also contains three broadly left of centre 
political parties. There are no actors in the third cluster among the ten most influential in the 
network and the average influence score of the organisations in the cluster is considerably 
lower than it is for the first two clusters. In the heterogeneous set of unconnected outsiders, the 
only actor with a high reputational influential score relative to the other organisations in the 
network is the Irish Farmer’s Association (IFA). Interestingly, they are perceived to be more 
influential than all the political parties as well as all the other non-government actors in the 
network.   
Fine Gael, the senior party in government, is also in the set of unconnected actors, but 
their influence score is relatively low. On the surface, this is a surprising result given that one 
of their most well-known TDs was Minister for the Environment when we conducted the 
survey. We suspect this finding may have been influenced by the wording in our questionnaire, 
which asked respondents to indicate which organisations they believed were influential in 
climate politics in recent years. Fine Gael had only been in government for 18 months when 
we started collecting data (following 14 years in opposition). Their low score may also partly 
be because scoring high on the reputational influence measure is not only correlated with 
influence over the decision-making process but also with the extent to which an actor is 
embedded in a network (Ingold & Leifeld 2016), which Fine Gael is not. That an actor with a 
low reputational influence score has few network ties is in line with previous research that has 
found that there is a tendency for policy actors to attribute more power to those with whom 
they collaborate and for actors to collaborate with those that they perceive to be influential 
(Fischer & Sciarini 2015). Fine Gael’s lack of cooperation ties may reflect the fact that as the 
main party in government they did not need to engage in coalition building to get their way. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 
Policy beliefs within clusters 
We use the composite scale variable that measures the strength of the pro-mitigation beliefs 
for each organisation (see methods section) to calculate the mean and the standard deviation of 
the beliefs of the organisations in each cluster. This allows us to measure the extent to which 
the organisations within each of the three clusters shared similar policy beliefs. We only 
analyse the beliefs data for the 52 survey respondents. Three of the non-respondents are in the 
heterogeneous set of unconnected outsiders, one is in the Governance cluster and one is in the 
Business, Energy and Research cluster.  
The actors in the Governance cluster and in the Business, Energy, and Research cluster 
expressed almost identical beliefs, in both their strength and their distribution (see means and 
standard deviations, Table 3). Their beliefs almost fully encapsulate the whole range of the 
positions expressed by all those who answered the questionnaire (Figure 1), providing evidence 
for the lack of consensus on policy positions within either of these two clusters.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The organisations in the Business, Energy, and Research cluster have quite different individual 
objectives, especially with regards to distributional and regulatory burden sharing. For 
example, ESB is in conflict with their commercial rival Airtricity because the former is heavily 
invested in the generation of electricity using coal, while the latter has invested much more in 
wind and gas. In the Governance cluster, the two organisations that indicated the least amount 
of support for pro-mitigation beliefs were Teagasc and the Department of Agriculture, both of 
which are advocates for the economic benefits of the country’s agricultural sector. In the same 
cluster, two scientific organisations, The Earth Institute and the Environmental Protection 
Agency, expressed a substantially higher level of support for pro-mitigation policies. This puts 
them in conflict with Teagasc and the Department of Agriculture. We therefore find no 
evidence to support the proposition that either the Governance cluster or the Business, Energy, 
and Research cluster are organised as advocacy coalitions.  
The pro-mitigation beliefs of the organisations in the cluster dominated by NGOs were 
stronger on average than those of the actors in the other clusters (Figure 1). The distribution of 
their beliefs was also half as narrow (Table 3). Their views are therefore distinct from those of 
the other clusters, and there was more consensus within the cluster about the range of policies 
that they supported. These results provide strong evidence that these organisations form a pro-
mitigation environmental advocacy coalition.  
The heterogeneous set of actors did not engage in any cooperative behaviour with one 
another and expressed a wide variety of different beliefs (Table 3). It is therefore not possible 
to argue that these organisations formed an advocacy coalition. Fine Gael, the senior party in 
government, was in this set, but the strength of their beliefs is unknown as they left many of 
the survey questions unanswered. The Irish Farmer’s Association (IFA), the most influential 
actor in the set, indicated the least amount of support for pro-mitigation policies. This finding 
means that the three organisations in the network that indicated the least amount of support for 
the implementation of pro-mitigation policies were heavily involved in agricultural issues: the 
IFA, the Department of Agriculture, and Teagasc. The three organisations were also among the 
ten most influential in the network, as perceived by survey respondents. In response to these 
findings, we investigated the extent to which the actors most involved in Ireland’s agricultural 
sector cooperated with one another on climate policy issues. We find no cooperation ties 
between the IFA and the Department of Agriculture, Teagasc or Bord Bia (The Irish Food 
Board) in our data. The three latter organisations did report cooperating with one another, but 
they do not form an agricultural coalition separate from the Governance cluster as they each 
have multiple cooperation ties with the actors in that cluster. 
 
Policy beliefs about the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Bill 2013 
We asked each of the organisations to indicate on a scale of -100 to +100 if they agreed or 
disagreed with the CCA Council proposed by the bill and if they agreed or disagreed with the 
inclusion of targets in the bill (see supplementary materials for respondent’s positions on these 
two issues). We used these data to develop two composite measures (see methods section) for 
the strength of each cluster’s support for the two proposals (Table 4). We do not calculate a 
composite measure for the set of heterogeneous actors because six of the organisations did not 
answer the climate bill questions.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The responses from the organisations in the Governance cluster indicate that as a group 
they slightly disagreed with the inclusion of targets and slightly agreed with the proposed CCA 
Council. Most actors in the cluster indicated a neutral position on both issues, but there were 
some organisations that took relatively strong positions. For example, Fianna Fáil (the main 
opposition political party) supported the inclusion of targets, while the Department of the 
Environment and the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) both strongly opposed 
their inclusion. It is not surprising that the Department of the Environment supported the 2013 
bill as they drafted it. Nor is it surprising that NESC opposed targets, as they had excluded any 
mention of a need for them in a report they published in 2013 analysing Ireland’s climate 
change challenges (NESC Secretariat, 2013). 
Turning to the organisations with agricultural interests, we find that the Department of 
Agriculture (DoA) opposed the inclusion of long-term targets. This is because adhering to them 
would make it extremely difficult for Ireland to meet the objectives of Food Harvest 2020 and 
Food Wise 2025 (the government’s strategies to increase the country’s agricultural output). 
The DoA’s own research projects that the best-case scenario if these strategies were to be 
successful would be that the absolute amount of emissions from the agricultural sector would 
remain about constant - cutting emissions and significantly increasing agricultural output does 
not seem possible (Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 2013). The DoA also 
supported the inclusion of Teagasc in the CCA Council. The IFA shared the positions of the 
DoA, opposing emissions targets (Torney, 2017) and welcoming the inclusion of Teagasc on 
the CCA Council (Irish Farmers’ Association, 2015). However, as pointed out above, these 
two organisations did not report collaboratively advocating for their shared positions. Teagasc 
indicated a neutral position on both targets and the CCA Council, while Bord Bia were neutral 
on targets but opposed the proposed CCA Council. The differences in the beliefs of the four 
agricultural organisations on these two issues provide additional evidence that they did not 
form a separate advocacy coalition. Of the four, the DoA and the IFA were the ones that most 
clearly got their way with the bill, but this did not happen through building an advocacy 
coalition or by collaborating with like-minded organisations. 
Organisations in the Business, Energy, and Research cluster did not indicate uniform 
positions on the two statements. The Institute of International and European Affairs supported 
the inclusion of targets and disagreed with the proposed CCA Council. SEAI strongly agreed 
with both the proposed CCA Council and the inclusion of targets. Ibec’s positions on the two 
issues were in line with those of the Department of the Environment. Ibec’s opinion is 
important and carries weight because it is Ireland’s largest business and employer association, 
representing the interests of over 7500 private sector organisations. They conduct research and 
lobby the government, policy makers and other stakeholders to shape business conditions and 
drive economic growth. They also have two committees (the Energy Policy Committee and the 
Environment Policy Committee) that routinely work with government departments on 
sustainability related matters.  
The actors in the environmental coalition were almost unanimous in the belief that long-
term emissions reduction targets needed to be included in an Irish climate law. The coalition 
strongly disagreed with the proposed CCA Council (Table 4), with the more vocal actors 
arguing that it should be independent of state and stakeholder interests (Stop Climate Chaos, 
2014). The Labour Party was the only organisation in the coalition that agreed with the 
proposed CCA Council and opposed the inclusion of national targets. The Party was the minor 
party in government when the data were collected for this research. Their position on targets 
in 2013 was a significant departure from their position in 2009, when they published a climate 
change bill that stated: “the duty of the Taoiseach [is] to ensure that Ireland’s net carbon 
account for the year 2050 is at least 80 per cent lower than the 1990 baseline” (Labour Party, 
2009).  
Fine Gael never prioritised climate change legislation (Little, 2017). Phil Hogan, the 
Party’s Minister for the Environment, published a bill in 2013 that did not include targets and 
envisioned the creation of a climate advisory body that would not be permitted to publish its 
reports without the government’s consent. Under his direction, the Department of the 
Environment published revised heads of a bill in 2014. This also omitted targets and excluded 
any reference to the independence of the Council, illustrating how little Fine Gael’s positions 
changed in the intervening period. The bill did however propose to increase the Council’s 
membership from eight to eleven (including the chairperson), thereby reducing the share of the 
ex officio members. The party steadfastly maintained their opposition to targets throughout the 
process (Little, 2017; RTÉ, 2014). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The process that led to the introduction of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development 
Act saw a particularly contentious debate take place over two issues: emissions reduction 
targets and the composition and independence of the Climate Change Advisory Council. To 
understand the factors that shaped how these issues were addressed in the law, we set out to 
answer two questions: (1) which organisations saw their preferences on these issues reflected 
in the law and (2) what role did advocacy coalitions play in the policy process? Our findings 
offer empirical results to support Flynn’s (2003) description of the Irish environmental policy 
domain: domestic NGOs are weak, powerful economic actors and government departments 
dominate the policy process, decisions are largely determined by the Cabinet, and economic 
issues are prioritised over ecological concerns.  
Our analysis shows that actors with strong pro-climate action beliefs formed an 
advocacy coalition and successfully put and kept on the political agenda the idea of an Irish 
climate law. Nevertheless, they failed to see their support for emissions reduction targets 
translate into legislation. Their campaign to persuade the government to establish a climate 
change advisory council similar to the UK’s Committee on Climate Change was not wholly 
successful either. The Irish law does establish a legally independent Council, but with an 
important caveat. Four of the ten members of the Council are directors or chief executives of 
organisations that actors in the environmental coalition believed were not sufficiently 
independent of both state and stakeholder interests: the EPA, ESRI, SEAI, and Teagasc. They 
were particularly concerned about the inclusion of Teagasc, whom they argued was too close 
to agricultural business interests.  
The most significant organisations to see their preferences reflected in the law were the 
two parties in government, Fine Gael and Labour, and the two most influential organisations 
involved in the agricultural sector: the Department of Agriculture and the Irish Farmer’s 
Association. The government parties’ opposition to targets and their decision to exclude them 
from the law was largely driven by their concern that targets would negatively impact plans to 
expand the country’s agricultural output. The Department of Agriculture and the IFA shared 
the belief that targets would constrain the agricultural sector. There were several other 
institutionally important and economically powerful organisations that also opposed targets 
(see supplementary materials). Even though these organisations were fewer in number than 
those supporting targets, they were perceived as being markedly more influential.  
The debate over the composition and the independence of the CCA Council was less 
contentious. Fine Gael and the Labour Party both initially agreed with the 2013 bill’s proposal, 
but in the very late stages of the law’s development the environmental coalition successfully 
persuaded the newly instated Labour Party Minister for the Environment to grant the Council 
legal independence. The Minister rejected the environmental coalition’s calls to change the 
composition of the Council’s membership. Most of the actors that supported the proposed 
Council were the same as those that that opposed targets (see supplementary materials).   
Interestingly, organisations did not get their way by forming advocacy coalitions. The 
IFA and the Department of Agriculture did not report cooperating with each other on climate 
policy. There is, of course, the possibility that individuals working for the DoA and the IFA 
did engage in informal cooperation and communication, even though as organisations they 
chose not to report cooperation in our survey. Such informal cooperation could be investigated 
by further studies using methods such as in-depth interviews. Other actors involved in the 
agricultural sector, Teagasc and Bord Bia, reported cooperating with one other and with the 
Department of Agriculture, but not with the IFA. Teagasc and Bord Bia do not however belong 
to the group of organisations that got their way as both were neutral on targets. Teagasc were 
also neutral on the proposed council, while Bord Bia opposed it. It would be difficult to argue, 
then, that there would have been an agricultural advocacy coalition marked by their shared 
beliefs and collaboration ties. Rather, whatever influence the IFA and the Department of 
Agriculture had on the bill was based on other factors. The most likely is that the IFA, the 
Department of Agriculture and the Fine Gael Minister for Agriculture all supported the 
expansion of Ireland’s agricultural output for economic reasons. The contextual reason for the 
success of economic arguments against emission reduction targets was the dire economic 
situation Ireland experienced during the years when the climate law was developed. Under 
these conditions, reviving the economy by spurring growth in a sector with significant potential 
became a desirable option, and the arguments opposing targets in the name of increasing 
agricultural output for export fell on fertile ground. 
Perhaps the most notable limitation of this study is it reliance on cross-sectional data. 
The most significant consequence of this is that it is not possible to be sure that the clusters and 
the coalition that we identify accurately capture long-lasting cooperation patterns. Our primary 
data also does not allow us to determine if any organisations changed their positions on the two 
issues after the survey was conducted, before the bill was revised or since the law was enacted. 
We addressed this by providing a qualitative account of any significant changes in the 
preferences of the most influential actors that were involved in the process.  
In addition to analysing the policy process that led to the establishment of the current Irish 
climate change legislation, we also contribute to the Advocacy Coalition Framework literature. 
Much of the literature tends to identify and describe the coalitions in a specific policy domain 
or to examine whether shared beliefs lead to coordinated action. We go beyond these efforts 
by analysing the role of advocacy coalitions during the design stage of a specific laws 
development, by determining which organisations saw their positions reflected in the final 
piece of legislation and by showing that coalition building was not key to getting one’s way. 
Indeed, this study shows how the formation of a coalition was used as a strategy of the weak, 
demonstrating that the approach is no guarantee of political success. In particular, when those 
who form a coalition are competing against those who do no need to because they already hold 
a significant amount of informal influence and share the interests and preferences of those in 
political power.  
The ACF contends that policy change can occur through four pathways: external 
subsystem events, internal subsystem dynamics, policy‐oriented learning, and through cross‐
coalition policy learning. This study shows how Ireland’s domestic climate policy was 
influenced by an external event, the passing of a climate law in the UK, and how the internal 
dynamics of the Irish climate policy domain resulted in legislation that differed to the UK law 
in several ways. The presence of only one advocacy coalition in the network implies that cross-
coalition learning could not and did not occur. Instead, the subset of actors that favoured strong 
climate action learned about the idea of national climate legislation from abroad - a finding that 
runs counter to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993, p.17) contention that “policy innovations 
normally occur first at a subnational level and then may get expanded into nationwide 
programs”. Thus, future research on the role of advocacy coalitions in national-level policy 
processes might draw on the policy transfer literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) to 
investigate if advocacy coalitions are more likely to be successful at transferring policies when 
they originate at the subnational level of government than when they come from aboard. 
Further studies might also consider the circumstances under which cross-coalition learning 
occurs between coalitions in different countries or between those at different levels of 
government.  
Finally, in light of the finding that coalitions played a very minor role in the case we 
studied, an important question for future research is whether advocacy coalitions have much 
influence at all in highly centralized Westminster style parliamentary democracies like Ireland, 
where executive power tends to be concentrated in single party majority cabinets. Research 
conducted in the United States, where the ACF was originally developed, has shown that 
advocacy coalitions are influential in large pluralist multi-level democracies with multiple veto 
points. In more consensual European democracies like Switzerland or Belgium ruling parties 
need broad support to move forward with a policy idea. Research designs comparing the role 
of coalitions across these three kinds of political systems could determine whether there are 
differences in the roles, strategies and the likelihood of success for advocacy coalitions 
depending on the institutional context. Such comparative research would help establish an 
understanding of the conditions under which coalitions matter for policy outcomes as well as 
the conditions under which other factors are more important.  
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Table 1 Respondents by Organisation Type 
Organisation Type No. of Organisations Response Rate 
Government Departments, State Agencies, Semi-State 
Bodies, and Local Authorities 
17 82%  
Energy  6 100% 
Scientific Research  8 100% 
NGOs & Advocacy Groups 11 100% 
Businesses, Business Interest Groups, Consultancies 9 78%  
Agricultural Interests 1 100% 
Political Parties 5 100% 
 Table 2 Most Influential Organisations in each cluster and their reputational influence score 
 Governance (Rep. Inf.) Business, Energy, and 
Research (Rep. Inf.) 
Environmental 
Coalition (Rep. Inf.) 
Heterogeneous 
Set of Actors 
(Rep. Inf.) 
1. Dept. of the Environment, 
Community and Local 
Government (0.71) 
Sustainable Energy 
Authority of Ireland 
(0.65) 
An Taisce (National 
Trust for Ireland) 
(0.33) 
Irish Farmers’ 
Association 
(0.43) 
2. Environmental Protection 
Agency (0.63) 
Ibec (0.41) Environmental Pillar 
(0.33) 
Byrne Ó 
Cléirigh (0.20) 
3. Dept. of Communication, 
Energy and Natural 
Resources (0.59) 
ESRI (Economic and 
Social Research Institute) 
(0.37) 
Friends of the Earth 
Ireland (0.27) 
 
Fine Gael (0.18) 
4. Dept. of Agriculture, Food 
and the Marine (0.53) 
Irish Wind Energy 
Association (0.37) 
Trócaire (0.25) 
 
Irish Corporate 
Leadership on 
Climate Change 
(0.18) 
5. Dept. of Finance (0.45) Commission for Energy 
Regulation (0.35) 
Mary Robinson 
Foundation (0.22) 
Green IFSC 
(0.16) 
6. National Economic and 
Social Council (0.45) 
Bord na Móna (0.27) Stop Climate Chaos 
(0.20) 
Irish Academy of 
Engineering 
(0.12) 
7. Teagasc (Agriculture and 
Food Development 
Authority) (0.43) 
IIEA (Institute of 
International and 
European Affairs) (0.27) 
Green Party (0.18) 
 
Chambers 
Ireland (.10) 
8. Dept. of Transport, Tourism 
and Sport (0.33) 
EirGrid (0.25) Birdwatch Ireland 
(0.16) 
National 
Offshore Wind 
Energy 
Association of 
Ireland (0.10) 
9. Dept. of Taoiseach (0.31) Bord Gáis Energy (0.24) 
 
Labour Party (0.14) 
 
Office of Public 
Works (0.08) 
10. Dept. of Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation (0.29) 
Coillte (0.22) 
 
Concern (0.14) 
 
Better 
Environment 
Nuclear Energy 
(0.00) 
  ESB (Electricity Supply 
Board) (0.22) 
 
Oxfam (0.14)  
 
 
Table 3 Factions  
 
Cluster 
 
Density 
 
Strength of Pro-Mitigation Beliefs (mean and s.d.) 
Governance  0.44 0.72 (0.115) 
Business, Energy, and Research 0.48 0.73 (0.107) 
Environmental Coalition 0.47 0.81 (0.057) 
Heterogeneous Set of Actors 0 0.67 (0.14) 
 
 Table 4 Positions on targets and the proposed advisory panel (a positive number signifies support for 
the statement) 
Cluster Inclusion of Targets Proposed CCA Council 
Governance  -12  +14 
Business, Energy, and Research +1  -2  
Environmental Coalition +75 -51 
 
 
Figure 1: Policy Beliefs (black dots = means; black lines = one standard deviation; red line = network 
mean) 
 
 
 
 
